This paper analyses the European prohibition of monetary financing from an economic perspective. The prohibition seeks to safeguard central bank independence in setting monetary policy to maintain price stability, and to preserve fiscal discipline, thereby preventing monetary policy from becoming constrained or hindered by fiscal policies. Imposing a prohibition on financing public deficits helps to ensure a clear separation of responsibilities between monetary policy and fiscal policy and is consistent with a range of macroeconomic theories, including monetarism and the fiscal theory of the price level. The current EU-wide ban is more stringent than those in place in Europe before the start of Economic and Monetary Union and also than those prevailing in other major currency areas of the world. Tasked with monitoring compliance with the prohibition among European national central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed certain standards over time, informed by definitions contained in EU regulations and by cases that have arisen over the years. Over the three decades since its introduction, the prohibition in general has been well respected, although a few actual or potential conflicts with the prohibition have required national central banks to take corrective action. Recent economic crises in Europe have given rise to academic proposals to reinterpret or circumvent the ban, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic. These suggestions have included central banks handing out “helicopter money” to the public and cancelling part of the government debt held by European central banks. In general, these proposals would seem to jeopardise the prohibition of monetary financing and ultimately weaken price stability and sound public finances.