Banknote imagery advisory group minutes – 15 July 2026
Meeting held 15 July 2026
Central banks
David Roberts CV and questionnaire for the Treasury Select Committee
Published for the Treasury Select Committee
When less is more: behavioral effects of CBDC holding limits
Holding limits are a central design feature of proposed retail central bank digital currencies (CBDC). While such limits mechanically prevent individuals from exceeding a maximum balance, they may also generate behavioral responses whose directions are a priori unclear. We conducted an incentivized online experiment with participants from four euro-area countries, exogenously varying the presence and level of a holding limit to causally separate direct mechanical effects from behavioral effects.
Stop believing in haircuts - at least the way you think about them
We study how frictions impact haircut setting in repo markets. Using transaction-level supervisory data and exploiting the 2021 introduction of the binding leverage ratio requirement, we show that three frictions jointly shape haircuts in the bilateral dealer-to-client segment: dealer balance sheet constraints, collateral convenience yields, and client outside options. In collateral-driven repos, binding leverage constraints and broader client outside options both raise haircuts, while higher convenience yields push them down.
When less is more: behavioral effects of CBDC holding limits
Holding limits are a central design feature of proposed retail central bank digital currencies (CBDC). While such limits mechanically prevent individuals from exceeding a maximum balance, they may also generate behavioral responses whose directions are a priori unclear. We conducted an incentivized online experiment with participants from four euro-area countries, exogenously varying the presence and level of a holding limit to causally separate direct mechanical effects from behavioral effects.
Stop believing in haircuts - at least the way you think about them
We study how frictions impact haircut setting in repo markets. Using transaction-level supervisory data and exploiting the 2021 introduction of the binding leverage ratio requirement, we show that three frictions jointly shape haircuts in the bilateral dealer-to-client segment: dealer balance sheet constraints, collateral convenience yields, and client outside options. In collateral-driven repos, binding leverage constraints and broader client outside options both raise haircuts, while higher convenience yields push them down.
Minutes of the SONIA Stakeholder Advisory Group - 25 September 2026
The SONIA Stakeholder Advisory Group supports the Bank’s administration of SONIA by providing advice and technical input to the Bank and the SONIA Oversight Committee
FEDS Paper: A Macroeconomic Analysis of Household Labor Supply Responses to Large Fiscal Transfers
Isabel Cairó, Shigeru Fujita, and Camilo Morales-JimenezThe fiscal transfers deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic were unprecedented in scale and strongly progressive. Using CPS/ASEC data, we document that the decline in employment during the pandemic was larger for low-income households and tightly linked to the intensity of transfer receipt, a pattern absent during the Global Financial Crisis.
What analysts hear and why it matters for monetary policy
We introduce a novel measure of how European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy is interpreted by analysts at major investment banks. We construct a “policy interpretation shock” based on the language used in analysts’ reports covering monetary policy decisions by the ECB’s Governing Council (GovC). The main identifying assumption is that changes in the way analysts report on policy communication by the GovC—that is, the change in the policy tone from the preview report to the recap report—reflect unexpected information revealed by the policy event.
The heterogeneous bank lending channel of monetary policy
How does heterogeneity in banks’ interest-rate risk exposure shape monetary policy transmission? We develop a quantitative macroeconomic model of heterogeneous banks to answer this question. We establish an irrelevance result: differences in interest-rate risk exposure between fixed- and variable-rate banking systems matter for transmission only when bank solvency concerns become relevant. Calibrating the model to the euro area, we show that idiosyncratic default risk pushes a substantial share of banks toward the solvency threshold, making heterogeneity quantitatively important.
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