Woodan/ShutterstockMore than 8,900 people aged under 30 were arrested for money laundering offences in England and Wales between 2020 and 2025. That’s more than six in ten of all money laundering arrests recorded during the period.
And our analysis of police data points to a growing problem that is not simply about young people committing financial crime. It also reveals how organised crime groups are recruiting young people as “money mules”. These are people who move or receive criminal funds on behalf of others.
The UK government already recognises the threat posed by money mule networks. The 2025 national risk assessment identified schools and universities as an emerging risk.
Students appear to be particularly vulnerable. The police officers we interviewed for our report said young people can be targeted because they may be under financial pressure, lack experience in managing money or be unaware of the risks of becoming involved in money laundering. International students were considered especially vulnerable, with officers reporting that some are targeted soon after arriving in the UK.
A money mule may be asked to receive funds into their bank account and transfer it elsewhere, sometimes in return for payment. They may not realise where the money came from or understand that what they are doing is a criminal offence.
Our analysis of data obtained from 36 police forces through freedom of information requests found 14,493 money laundering arrests between January 2020 and January 2025. Of these, 8,956 involved people aged 18 to 29. A further 776 under-18s were recorded by 35 forces.
These figures do not tell us how many of those arrested were students. Police forces do not routinely record student status, so age is only an imperfect indication of involvement in education. But the scale of youth involvement is clear.
Most money laundering arrests involve people under the age of 30.
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Students are vulnerable to acting as a money mules because they face financial pressures, are engaged with social media and lack awareness of the legal consequences of acting as a money mule. Organised crime groups have exploited these factors by using fake job advertisements and online recruitment tactics that promise easy income in exchange for using personal bank accounts to transfer funds.
International students may be especially vulnerable due to their need for UK bank accounts and cross-border financial activity. As a result, students can become unwitting participants in laundering the proceeds of fraud and organised crime. As one police officer told us “as soon as international students land in the UK … they are inundated with messages about money laundering”.
The data also reveals large differences between police forces. Money laundering arrests were concentrated in some of the UK’s largest urban areas. However, this may reflect differences in the scale of organised crime, financial activity and police resources. It may also reflect differences in how forces record offences.
More broadly, our report suggests that the criminal justice system is better equipped to deal with relatively straightforward money laundering cases than the more complex networks behind them. This is important because focusing on the person who moves the money can obscure the people directing the operation.
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Young people recruited as money mules may be involved at the lowest level of a much larger criminal enterprise. Some may knowingly participate. Others may be manipulated, exploited or persuaded that what they are doing is harmless.
Our report noted that universities can be exposed to money laundering in a number of ways including through payments of fees or donations – thus unknowingly facilitating money laundering by students.
Yet universities are not currently covered by the UK’s money laundering regulations 2017 in the same way as regulated sectors such as banks, lawyers and accountants. That means universities do not have the same general obligations to identify and report suspected money laundering.
Our previous research illustrated that universities are susceptible to money laundering due to large financial flows and receipt of cash payments for tuition and accommodation fees. That research also found that over 20% of universities do not provide any anti-money laundering guidance to their students.
In our interviews and surveys with regional organised crime units and the City of London Police, we found uncertainty about how the rules apply to higher education. This can leave police focusing on the person receiving or transferring illicit money, rather than on potential risks within the institution or the wider criminal network.
An inconsistency problem
Police interviewees described shortages of staff, specialist expertise and investigative resources. Some said economic crime could become a forgotten area when police forces are dealing with competing priorities.
Relationships between police forces and universities also varied considerably. In some areas, there were established local contacts and effective partnerships. In others, cooperation depended on individual relationships rather than a consistent national approach.
This fragmented response is particularly problematic when criminal networks operate across police force boundaries.
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Our analysis does not suggest that universities are routinely being used to launder money. Nor can it establish how many students are involved in recorded money laundering offences. The available data has limitations, including differences in how police forces record offences.
But our findings point to a clear gap between the scale of the problem and the information available about it.
What should happen next?
Our analysis points to four priorities.
First, universities should be brought within the money laundering regulations. This would give higher education institutions clear responsibilities for identifying and reporting suspected money laundering.
Second, prevention needs to start earlier and be more targeted. Universities should include money-mule awareness in student induction programmes, alongside financial education and social media campaigns. International students, who may be unfamiliar with the risks and the UK banking system, should receive particular support.
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Third, universities and police forces need stronger partnerships. Sharing information and building established links could help identify suspicious activity and patterns of recruitment before individual cases become part of a larger criminal investigation.
Finally, the Home Office should develop a dedicated national strategy for money laundering and money-mule activity in educational settings. A consistent approach would help address the uneven enforcement, resources and relationships between police forces that our report identified.
Our report suggests that tackling money laundering effectively means looking beyond the person whose bank account receives the money. Young people may be the most visible part of the problem. But they are not necessarily the ones at the heart of it.
Nicholas Ryder receives funding from the Joffe Trust. Sam Mapston receives funding from the Joffe Trust.