Financial institutions

Stop believing in haircuts - at least the way you think about them

We study how frictions impact haircut setting in repo markets. Using transaction-level supervisory data and exploiting the 2021 introduction of the binding leverage ratio requirement, we show that three frictions jointly shape haircuts in the bilateral dealer-to-client segment: dealer balance sheet constraints, collateral convenience yields, and client outside options. In collateral-driven repos, binding leverage constraints and broader client outside options both raise haircuts, while higher convenience yields push them down.

FEDS Paper: A Macroeconomic Analysis of Household Labor Supply Responses to Large Fiscal Transfers

Isabel Cairó, Shigeru Fujita, and Camilo Morales-JimenezThe fiscal transfers deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic were unprecedented in scale and strongly progressive. Using CPS/ASEC data, we document that the decline in employment during the pandemic was larger for low-income households and tightly linked to the intensity of transfer receipt, a pattern absent during the Global Financial Crisis.

What analysts hear and why it matters for monetary policy

We introduce a novel measure of how European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy is interpreted by analysts at major investment banks. We construct a “policy interpretation shock” based on the language used in analysts’ reports covering monetary policy decisions by the ECB’s Governing Council (GovC). The main identifying assumption is that changes in the way analysts report on policy communication by the GovC—that is, the change in the policy tone from the preview report to the recap report—reflect unexpected information revealed by the policy event.

The heterogeneous bank lending channel of monetary policy

How does heterogeneity in banks’ interest-rate risk exposure shape monetary policy transmission? We develop a quantitative macroeconomic model of heterogeneous banks to answer this question. We establish an irrelevance result: differences in interest-rate risk exposure between fixed- and variable-rate banking systems matter for transmission only when bank solvency concerns become relevant. Calibrating the model to the euro area, we show that idiosyncratic default risk pushes a substantial share of banks toward the solvency threshold, making heterogeneity quantitatively important.

What analysts hear and why it matters for monetary policy

We introduce a novel measure of how European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy is interpreted by analysts at major investment banks. We construct a “policy interpretation shock” based on the language used in analysts’ reports covering monetary policy decisions by the ECB’s Governing Council (GovC). The main identifying assumption is that changes in the way analysts report on policy communication by the GovC—that is, the change in the policy tone from the preview report to the recap report—reflect unexpected information revealed by the policy event.

The heterogeneous bank lending channel of monetary policy

How does heterogeneity in banks’ interest-rate risk exposure shape monetary policy transmission? We develop a quantitative macroeconomic model of heterogeneous banks to answer this question. We establish an irrelevance result: differences in interest-rate risk exposure between fixed- and variable-rate banking systems matter for transmission only when bank solvency concerns become relevant. Calibrating the model to the euro area, we show that idiosyncratic default risk pushes a substantial share of banks toward the solvency threshold, making heterogeneity quantitatively important.

FEDS Paper: Inattentive Price Setting and Inflation Under Fiscal Policy Uncertainty

Oliver Pfäuti and Edson WuHow do high public debt and fiscal uncertainty interact to shape inflation? We develop a model in which firms face uncertainty about both marginal costs and fiscal policy and choose how much information to acquire before setting prices. Higher debt raises steady-state taxes, affecting attention through two opposing forces. While these taxes reduce the profit stakes of mispricing, they make desired prices more sensitive to tax fluctuations, increasing the value of information.

Fiscal integration as a Pareto improvement

Fiscal integration in a currency union is generally understood as a transfer from fiscally strong to fiscally weak countries. I show that this changes when common debt is paired with a non-defaultable common tax, even if national debt remains defaultable. The risky country gains from intertemporal trade: it receives a grant financed by a perpetual obligation it discounts more heavily than lenders do. The cost to the safe member is second-order and the tax removes it by insuring imperfectly correlated cycles rather than transferring resources in expectation.

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