Financial institutions

Bank fragility and risk management

Shocks to a bank’s ability to raise liquidity at short notice can trigger depositor panics. Why don’t banks take a more active role in managing these risks? We study contingent risk management (hedging) in a standard global-games model of a bank run. Banks fail to hedge precisely when the exposure to a shock is most severe, just when risk management would have the biggest impact. Higher bank capital and broader deposit-insurance coverage crowd out hedging by banks that already manage risk, yet encourage more banks to establish risk management desks in the first place.

Bank fragility and risk management

Shocks to a bank’s ability to raise liquidity at short notice can trigger depositor panics. Why don’t banks take a more active role in managing these risks? We study contingent risk management (hedging) in a standard global-games model of a bank run. Banks fail to hedge precisely when the exposure to a shock is most severe, just when risk management would have the biggest impact. Higher bank capital and broader deposit-insurance coverage crowd out hedging by banks that already manage risk, yet encourage more banks to establish risk management desks in the first place.

From risk to buffer: calibrating the positive neutral CCyB rate in the euro area

This paper proposes a novel yet intuitive method for the calibration of the CCyB through the cycle in the euro area, including the positive neutral CCyB rate. The paper implements the Risk-to-Buffer framework by Couaillier and Scalone (2024) in both a DSGE and macro time series setting and proposes a calibration of the PN CCyB aimed to reduce the macroeconomic amplification of shocks occurring in an environment where risks are neither subdued nor elevated.

From risk to buffer: calibrating the positive neutral CCyB rate in the euro area

This paper proposes a novel yet intuitive method for the calibration of the CCyB through the cycle in the euro area, including the positive neutral CCyB rate. The paper implements the Risk-to-Buffer framework by Couaillier and Scalone (2024) in both a DSGE and macro time series setting and proposes a calibration of the PN CCyB aimed to reduce the macroeconomic amplification of shocks occurring in an environment where risks are neither subdued nor elevated.

When margins call: liquidity preparedness of non-bank financial institutions

We propose a novel framework to assess systemic risk stemming from the inadequate liquidity preparedness of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) to derivative margin calls. Unlike banks, NBFIs may struggle to source liquidity and meet margin calls during periods of significant asset price fluctuations, potentially triggering asset fire sales and amplifying market volatility. We develop a set of indicators and statistical methods to assess liquidity preparedness and examine risk transmission through common asset holdings and counterparty exposures.

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