Bank competition and credit risk: the conditioning role of capital

This paper examines how bank capital conditions the effect of competition on credit risk in lending markets, informing the debate on banking competition, deregulation, and risk-based supervision. Using ECB supervisory data for 146 euro area banks across 19 countries over 2020Q2–2025Q3, we analyze whether this relationship depends on banks’ regulatory capital positions. We find that greater market power is associated with higher subsequent credit risk, while stronger capitalization is associated with lower risk.

Bank competition and credit risk: the conditioning role of capital

This paper examines how bank capital conditions the effect of competition on credit risk in lending markets, informing the debate on banking competition, deregulation, and risk-based supervision. Using ECB supervisory data for 146 euro area banks across 19 countries over 2020Q2–2025Q3, we analyze whether this relationship depends on banks’ regulatory capital positions. We find that greater market power is associated with higher subsequent credit risk, while stronger capitalization is associated with lower risk.

Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment

Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets. This effect does not pre-date the supervisory reform and it does not obtain in non-SSM jurisdictions.

Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment

Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets. This effect does not pre-date the supervisory reform and it does not obtain in non-SSM jurisdictions.

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